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1. Introduction
The power to set agendas - defined most broadly as the ability of an agent who
possesses information to filter, emphasize and determine what types of issues are
important for another agent or public - has been widely studied in Political Science
and Media Economics as one of the key determinants in the distribution of political
power (Edwards and Wood, 1999; Baumgartner and Jones, 2009). Its importance is a
consequence of the influence that this power has in the selection and implementation
of public policies (Baumgartner, 2001; Edwards and Wood, 1999; Edwards, Mitchell
and Welch, 1995; Baumgartner and Jones, 2009); as well as the impact that it has
on the accountability of some groups in the justice system and the media (Jones and
Baumgartner, 2005).
Academic literature has shown the relevance of this phenomenon in explaining
the amount of attention given to different economic problems (Eshbaugh-Soha and
Peake, 2005) and to various elements of foreign policy (Milner and Tingley, 2010;
Peake, 2001; Wood and Peake, 1998). This is the case equally for the leading actors of
executive power and for representatives of the legislative branch (Ghanem, 1997; Zhang
and Meadows III, 2012). However, this type of information manipulation hypothesis
has focused on the behavior of the media and the different political power structures
within a country (Cohen, 1995; Edwards and Wood, 1999), and not on effects outside
its borders.
Except for the works of Livingston (1992), Goldsmith and Horiuchi (2009) and
Joachim (2003), the literature related to international political agenda-setting is lack-
ing, particularly in terms of finding quantitative evidence that the phenomenon exists.
Similarly, the channels through which it is possible to exercise this power of agenda
setting are not clear and, despite efforts to understand the direct influence of one coun-
try over another (see for example: Goldsmith and Horiuchi (2009)), the few theoretical
approaches tend to operate in terms of qualitative models that do not allow analysis
of comparative statics, fundamental in understanding more complex dynamics.
Consequently, the aim of this study is to develop an initial theoretical and em-
pirical approach to this kind of agenda-setting, from a political incentives perspective
and between agents different to those currently studied in the literature. Specifically,
it seeks to understand the ability of one country to set the political agenda of another
through the influence of international assistance, taking into account the diplomacy
and discourse of the said countries’ presidents.
With respect to studies on foreign aid, the research landscape is completely
different to that on international agenda-setting. There is an abundance of theoretical
models on the influence of foreign aid, and the empirical evidence of its effects are
undoubted (Svensson, 2000a,b; Cheng, Zhang and Zou, 2008; Bueno-de Mesquita
and Smith, 2007; Dube and Naidu, 2010, to cite a few). Nevertheless, this paper
seeks to combine the best of both approaches in its focus. Firstly, it models the
incentives behind public policy proposed by agenda-setting research using the concept
of cost-benefit commonly found in mathematical modeling of foreign aid. Secondly, it
incorporates the amount of attention that governments pay to different problems as
an additional control variable in deciding on the amount of aid. The latter, as per the
tradeoff posed in the literature on local agenda-setting, is based on the time assigned
to different issues. Finally, the quantitative analysis makes equal use of computer-
assisted content analysis (common in agenda studies at the end of the ’90s) and aid
data reported in research on international politics.
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I show that governments, which offer foreign aid, can set the political agenda of
recipient governments through two channels. Firstly, the aid reduces the political costs
of official intervention as a result of increased international relevance for the problems
receiving assistance. This increases the political benefit of making statements on such
issues and encourages the aid recipient to modify its agenda. Secondly, international
aid creates incentives for political rent-seeking when the recipient government may
benefit directly or indirectly from a positive fraction of the funds.
These channels are studied in the case of aid supplied to Colombia by the USA
during the period 1998-2002, where I show the power that US presidents had to set
part of the Colombian political agenda related to drugs and terrorism. It was found
that military aid, rather than economic aid, is responsible for linking the agendas of
both countries.
The results mentioned above are obtained using a novel computerized content
analysis of presidential speeches and an instrumental variable estimation that cap-
tures the exogenous variation of aid supplied to Colombia. These results are robust
to controlling for different temporary characteristics and variables associated with
terrorist and drug-related activity, in Colombia and worldwide.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a simple theo-
retical model of International Agenda-Setting. Section 3 provides an overview of the
history of US aid in Colombia and the relevance to study this history through the
theoretical model. Section 4 discusses the data of Aid and how the agendas studied
are constructed through a content analysis of both countries’ presidential speeches.
Section 5 explains the empirical strategy while Section 6 describes the quantitative
data. Section 7 uses that data to test the main implications of the model and provides
some robustness exercises. Finally, section 8 concludes, while some details on data
collection are contained in the Appendices.
2. Theoretical Framework
This section formalizes the channels through which foreign aid may be used
as a political agenda-setting mechanism. Specifically, it develops a simple model
where political rent-seeking and the importance that citizens place on different issues
determine the amount of attention that the government pays to matters that receive
foreign aid.
2.1. An Agenda-setting Model
Consider the insight behind the qualitative model of agenda-setting proposed
by Cohen (1995) in which a president has the ability to set the public agenda of
a country through his official statements. Furthermore, suppose that this president
affects not only the national agenda but also the international political agenda through
a mechanism of economic incentives. This mechanism may consist of military or
economic aid, or logistic support to other countries. In this sense, the external effect
of a presidential statement is equally dependent on the amount of resources involved
at the moment of intervention and the amount of attention given to the topic, which
attracted aid.
To put this interaction formally, suppose a world with two democratically elected
governments, A and B. These governments obtain benefits from being in power, but
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they obtain them to a greater degree when the electorate approves of the policies
they implement. These additional benefits may be in the form of direct income from
a private sector that is satisfied with the performance of the executive authorities, or
from the ease of governing a country with little opposition.
Furthermore, suppose that the government’s policies are accompanied by a media
campaign in which the heads of state announce the results and the relevance of their
policies. This campaign is responsible for realizing the political benefits of executing
the government’s programs, given that by communicating the government’s progress
they indirectly gain new supporters.
Following on from the above, the political benefits in countries A and B of
focusing attention on a specific issue k is defined as:
ΠkA = λ
k
Aa
k
A − CkA(akA, λkA) and ΠkB = λkBakB − CkB(akB, λkB)(1)
Where λkAa
k
A and λ
k
Ba
k
B represent the political benefit of focusing attention on an issue
k, where λkA and λ
k
B are the level of importance that each country’s citizens attach to
the topic. Equally, CkA(a
k
A, λ
k
A) and C
k
B(a
k
B, λ
k
B) are the political costs of making public
statements about k1. A similar qualitative perspective is presented by Eshbaugh-Soha
(2010) who examines the existence of a presidential dilemma between the costs and
benefits of making statements on different issues.
Assumption 1: CkA and C
k
B are continuous functions, twice differentiable in their
first arguments and governed by: C
′
1 > 0, C
′
2 < 0.
That is, the political costs increase with the amount of attention given to a spe-
cific topic and decrease with the citizens’ degree of interest in the topic. This allows
us to model the restriction for a government that seeks to deal with multiple prob-
lems without the capacity to do so comprehensively, either because of high economic
costs or because of the obvious restriction of term of office. For example, Jones and
Baumgartner (2005) show how leaders trying to resolve the problem of time allocation
face a variety of rising costs, such as those associated with the definitive consolidation
of their programs or the difficulty associated with promoting policies with extreme
ideologies. In this sense, there is a governmental incentive to give priority to topics
that greatly interest the population over others that have less importance for the
electorate. Nevertheless, the following is established:
Assumption 2: For all issues k relevant to the population it holds that: CkA(0, ·)
= c¯A > 0 and C
k
B(0, ·) = c¯B >0. Furthermore, it is given that C ′′1 > 0
That is, it is not desirable to neglect themes of public interest, as it is far more
costly for a government to publicly exclude relevant topics with λA and λB > 0, than
to marginally attend to each of them. Intuitively, this assumption establishes that
very biased governments, which are strongly inclined to under- or over-attend certain
issues, assume greater political costs than governments that decide to show a balanced
interest in each of the problems that face them.
1For simplicity’s sake, the government’s capacity for local agenda-setting has been omitted from the mathematical
modeling. That is, the second-round effects of government attention on citizens’ interest (λkA and λ
k
B) have been
omitted.
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Now suppose that for government B, the process of obtaining benefits is more
complicated than for government A, and its citizens evaluate the suitability of its
policies depending on its performance inside and outside its borders. Specifically, the
benefit to B of attending to a particular issue k will be directly related to the actions
that the government promotes nationally and abroad. That is, suppose that the degree
of importance λkB is made up of two elements: 1) The local relevance of problem k,
denoted by α¯k, and 2) How important it is to the people that the president’s actions
are consistent with his words2, denoted by pwk. This last element incorporates the
significance of foreign aid wk on the benefits of the donor country.
There is, therefore, a simple dynamic in which government B decides on the
amount of attention akB, and also establishes a monetary quantity w
k of foreign aid,
related to issue k, in the country which A governs. These resources may represent any
type of aid aimed at issues that B considers pertinent because of the political benefit
it can derive from them3. Thus, p represents the political benefit for B of “putting its
money where its mouth is”.
Including this final element is vital for the analysis. Powlick and Katz (1998)
conduct a wide-ranging analysis of the literature that studies citizens’ interest as a
conditional element of foreign aid for different US governments. To incorporate this
final point, we assume the following:
Assumption 3: The political return for government B of focusing its attention on
issue k is defined by: λkBa
k
B =
(
α¯k + pwk
) × akB, where α¯k is the benefit of domestic
approval and pwk is the benefit of demonstrating consistency between the president’s
attention and actions in international politics.
Another component to take into account when defining political costs is issue
k’s relevance in the context of international politics. For example, initiatives on a
world scale, such as fighting AIDS or eradicating malaria, lower the political costs of
addressing such topics. On an international level it allays reservations about dealing
with certain problems (Laurence, 2006) and facilitates dialog between countries with
common goals (Haas, 1980; Cobb, Ross and Ross, 1976). To incorporate this added
factor in the model, we assume the following:
Assumption 4: The costs of making statements on a particular issue k are reduced
by the amount of attention given to the issue internationally, specifically: CkA(a
k
A, λ
k
A +∑
j 6=A a
k
j lj) = C
k
A(a
k
A, λ
k
A + (Ψ + a
k
BlB)) and C
k
B(a
k
B, λ
k
B +
∑
j 6=B a
k
j lj) = C
k
B(a
k
B, λ
k
B +
(Ψ+akAlA)). Where Ψ is the level of international attention independent of governments
A and B, and lB is the relative importance of government B in international politics,
with lB  lA.
Note that this assumption incorporates the fact that governments which receive aid
do not carry great weight in the international political scene, and accordingly have
relatively less “important” than the donor country (lA  lB). Finally, the benefit
2Although there are issues for which foreign intervention is not applicable, this model gives special attention to
issues that can be seen as problems of an international nature.
3Goldsmith, Horiuchi and Inoguchi (2005) show three qualitative models, which can be used to present this resource
transferring behavior. In this particular case, the mechanism that corresponds to the work of Goldsmith, Horiuchi and
Inoguchi (2005) is the desire to exert international influence in order to gain public approval.
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functions, including the new incentives for A and B are redefined as:
ΠkA = λ
k
Aa
k
A + δ
kakAw
k − CkA(akA, λkA + (Ψ + akBlB))(2)
ΠkB = (α¯
k + pwk)akB − CkB(akB, α¯k + pwk + (Ψ + akAlA))−
s
2
(wk)2(3)
Where δkakAw
k is the political benefit for A of focusing on issue k, for which it has
received foreign aid. The parameter δk indicates the possibility of perceiving some
political benefit, either direct or indirect, through the deployment of these resources.
Thus, when δk = 0 there is perfect exogeneity in aid giving, while if δk ∈ (0, 1] there
is a positive fraction of benefit perceived by government A when it focuses more
attention on the issues for which B provides aid.
In this manner, the aid offers A an incentive for political rent-seeking if δk >
0. Consequently, wk operates as a positive externality produced by B on A. The
appearance of such externalities is studied in detail by Svensson (2000a) who finds
that these types of incentives cause low effectiveness in the deployment of international
aid and create perverse incentives within governments and different groups of society
(Busse and Groning, 2009; Sullivan, Tessman and Li, 2011; Karlan and Appel, 2011).
Finally, notice that the resources transferred to A represent an additional political
cost for B, as this government must not only finance the attention paid to the issue,
but also justify the deviation of local resources abroad. This political cost, represented
by s
2
, may be seen as the legislative cost of approving a unit of aid in congress, or
simply the opportunity cost of public funds wk.
2.2. Timing of Events
The sequence of events for each issue k, which for simplicity’s sake we will assume
to be independent of each other, is as follows:
• At t = 1, government B decides on the level of attention akB and an aid level wk
that maximizes its political benefits, taking into account the costs of processing
the foreign aid s/2 and the level of domestic approval for the policy α¯k.
• At t = 2, government A observes the level of aid planned for its country and
determines, given the possibilities of benefitting δk and the level of local approval
λkA, a level of attention a
k
A that maximizes its benefits.
• At t = 3, governments A and B make their payments according to the levels of
attention and aid amounts previously determined.
2.3. Theoretical Results
The different stages of the model can be seen as a sequential game of three periods
and two players (See Figure 1), which is decided by backwards induction. Specifically,
note that the problem government A faces at t = 2 is as follows:
max
akA
{
akA(λ
k
A + δ
kwk,?)− CkA(akA, λkA + (Ψ + ak,?B lB))
}
(4)
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Where wk,? and ak,?B represent the optimum decisions of government B at t = 1.
Nevertheless, we know that B anticipates the behavior of A at t = 2 and therefore
makes a strategic decision regarding wk and akB, taking into account the level of
attention chosen by A. Thus, government B solves the following problem:
max
akB ,w
k
{
(α¯k + pwk)akB − CkB(akB, α¯k + pwk + (Ψ + ak,?A lA))−
s
2
(wk)2
}
(5)
From which it is possible to deduce the following results:
Proposition 1: For government B, wk is a sufficient political agenda-setting mech-
anism if there are opportunities for government A to obtain political benefits, either
direct or indirect, from the deployment of aid. Formally, B can set the political agenda
of A with an amount of aid wk if δk > 0. In other words, if δk > 0 it holds that
∂akA
∂wk
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 1 (See appendix)
Proposition 2: If government B carries significant weight in international politics
(lB > 0), then it is possible for government B to set A’s political agenda by reducing
the costs of addressing certain issues. That is, if lB > 0, then
∂akA
∂akB
> 0 and this change
is due to a reduction the costs of official intervention.
Proof of Proposition 2 (See appendix)
3. Background to the Colombian-US Case
This section discusses the case of US aid in Colombia in order to study its
implications using the theoretical model developed in the previous section. Specifically,
US aid policies against drugs and terrorism in Colombia are briefly described, and we
see why it is interesting to study this aid with the help of the theoretical model.
3.1. US Aid in Colombia
Providing military and economic aid to developing countries is a fundamental
component of US foreign policy. These programs began formally with the reconstruc-
tion of Europe through the Marhsall Plan, after the Second World War, and they
B B A
ak,B ∈ [0, 1] ak,A ∈ [0, 1]wk ∈ <+ (ΠA,ΠB)
Figure 1. The Agenda-Setting Model as a Sequential Game
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evolved afterwards to support America’s markedly anti-communist stance during the
Cold War. Until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, US foreign aid focused on pre-
venting the dissemination of communist ideas, mainly in Latin America, South-East
Asia and Africa (Tarnoff and Lawson, 2009). In the 1990s, faced with the absence
of a clearly defined enemy, the foreign aid budget decreased considerably, and it was
not until after September 11, 2001, that the US government once again increased this
budget as an antiterrorist tool in response to the violent acts that occurred in the
country on that date.
As well as the anticommunist and antiterrorist goals mentioned above, the US
has justified its foreign aid with commercial and humanitarian arguments. These
include: promoting economic growth, reducing poverty, improving access to basic
healthcare and education, protecting the environment, promoting stability in regions
of conflict, protecting human rights, the non-proliferation of arms and the fight against
the production and traffic of drugs (Tarnoff and Lawson, 2009).
US foreign aid can be described through five strategic goals that cover the main
sectors financed. The first of these is Peace and Security, which consists of six programs
including the fight against terrorism, the fight against weapons of mass destruction and
the fight against drugs. The second goal is Investing in People, which comprises three
programs coordinated through health, education, and social services and protection of
vulnerable populations. The third goal, Governing Justly and Democratically, brings
together issues related to the rule of law, human rights, good government practices,
political competition and inclusion of civil society. The fourth goal, Economic Growth,
includes programs designed for developing economies and are related to agriculture,
infrastructure, environment and the environment. Finally, the fifth goal is called Hu-
manitarian Assistance and seeks to help with problems caused by natural disasters or
internal conflicts (Tarnoff and Lawson, 2009).
In Latin America and the Caribbean, foreign aid has been one of the USA’s tools
for furthering its interests in the region. The programs financed have been diverse and
tailored to the needs of each country. Since 1946, the US has consolidated itself as
the largest contributor of foreign aid to countries in the region, disbursing more than
USD$148 billion since that year until the present day (Meyer and Sullivan, 2012).
In recent years, the main beneficiaries of US-financed aid programs in Latin
America and the Caribbean have been Haiti, Mexico and Colombia. For Haiti, aid
has focused on the country’s recovery after the earthquake in 2010, and for Mexico,
on fighting the drug trafficking that has spread over recent years (Meyer and Sullivan,
2012). In the case of Colombia, its position as the world?s largest producer of cocaine
has, over the past two decades, converted the country into the largest beneficiary of
US military aid (Dube and Naidu, 2010).
The US programs have been designed to assist the Colombian government in
maintaining control of lands once dominated by drug trafficking and illegal armed
groups. Additional goals include: creating jobs and alternative legal economies; in-
creased security and State presence; and the intensification of prohibition programs
and eradication of illicit crops. These programs are centralized in Colombia through
the US Agency for International Development (USAID), which is responsible for imple-
menting the programs through various mechanisms such as contracts and cooperative
agreements with non-government organizations, the private sector and contract com-
panies.
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Colombia began to receive aid aimed at eradicating drugs during the period
known as the War on Drugs in the 1980s (Dube and Naidu, 2010). In 1990, through
the Andean Initiative, the US granted USD$200 million in an aid package designed to
combat drug trafficking, providing specialized training and equipment for Colombia?s
armed forces. In 1994, aid decreased markedly owing to deteriorating relations between
the US government and the recently elected Colombian president Ernesto Samper. It
was not until Adre´s Pastrana came to power in 1998 that the US implemented Plan
Colombia with a package of USD$1,200 million in 2000, and as it had for the Andean
Initiative, allocated a large proportion of resources to providing specialized training
and equipment for anti-narcotics operations.
In the period 2000-2001, Plan Colombia was proposed as a strategy of bilateral
cooperation to combat illicit drugs and organized crime (DANE and DJS, 2006),
reassigning US aid, which had previously been focused on the National Police to the
army. This was done in order to ensure military support of Colombia’s armed forces
in such a way that the fight against drugs became highly military (Tickner, 2004).
With the breakdown of peace talks with the FARC in February 2002, and after
the attacks on September 11, 2001, there was a change in rhetoric in US foreign policy
regarding the problems in Colombia. America began to advocate the fight against
terrorism, including the threats of drugs and arms trafficking in its agenda. For the
first time since the end of the Cold War the US agreed to fund military activities that
were not related to the fight against drugs, allowing the military units provided by
Plan Colombia to be used for the fight against terrorism (Tickner, 2004).
After Plan Colombia was implemented, the military strategy was modified through
the creation of mobile brigades consisting of anti-guerrilla units. From 2004, military
aid has been used primarily to increase the effectiveness of military training, including
different types of centers and schools such as infantry, air force and police. This period
coincides with major increases in disbursements allocated to combating drugs and
illegal armed groups (U.S. Office on Colombia and FOR, 2010).
Between 2002 and 2006, US military aid grew considerably, reaching its peak
in 2004 when it increased by approximately 46% compared to the aid provided in
2002, partly in support of the security policies implemented by A´lvaro Uribe Ve´lez’s
government. The average aid for this budget item surpassed USD$197 million4 - more
than a third of the total aid given from the US to Colombia. From 2008, however,
the amount disbursed has gradually decreased and in 2012 it dropped to USD$145
million, its lowest level in 12 years5, due in part to budget cuts after the economic
crisis of 2008. Figure 3 shows the pattern of aid directed to Colombia and non-Latin
American counties, where the observations above are summarized6.
Taking the above into account, the Colombian-US case is interesting to analyze
using the theoretical model developed here for many reasons. Firstly, the recent con-
centration of aid on the military budget demands a detailed study of the incentives
that the deployment of these resources may create in the country. Secondly, we must
determine if Colombia, as a major recipient of US aid in South America, has really
4Value at 2010 constant prices calculated based on the official price index published by the US Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS).
5Expected figures based on information from foreignassistance.gov
6It is worth clarifying that the aid totals determined by the US congress are approved from the beginning of the
US fiscal year and not the Colombian calendar year. Consequently, due to the time adjustment necessary, some of the
peaks in the figure (5) showing changes in resources do not exactly coincide with the peaks reported by USAID.
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been politically influenced by the US, and if it has, if this effect is independent of the
ideological alignment of both countries’ governments. Finally, knowing that Colombia
continually questions the strong influence the US government’s position has on the
country’s political and economic decisions, it becomes relevant to study the relation-
ship of their agendas through an analysis of incentives that covers the problem of
assigning presidential attention and the strategic distribution of foreign aid.
4. Information Used and Forming of Agendas
To analyze the main implications of the model presented in section 2, we must
create a replicable measure of the governments’ political agendas. Although in general
terms the political agenda is the set of issues given priority by the administration and
which forms the basis for their political actions, it is not difficult to find discrepancies
between the agenda proposed during a campaign and what really occurs over a term
of office. For this reason it is desirable to use a methodology that helps us determine
which elements actually make up a government’s political agenda over time.
Previous studies for other countries have used different approaches to achieve
this. For example, Wood and Peake (1998) and Edwards and Wood (1999) derive the
presidential agenda on different issues from the number of paragraphs dedicated to
them in transcriptions of presidential speeches. Authors such as Quinn et al. (2010)
and Cohen (1995), on the other hand, use a methodology based on the use of words or
sentences throughout different official texts to determine the composition of political
agenda.
However, the three methodologies mentioned above (paragraphs, sentences and
words) omit important elements: 1) They do not take into account peak periods of
official communication associated with specific moments when the presidents must
speak more for reasons exogenous to the forming of agenda; and 2) They assume that
the presidents are comparable in absolute terms throughout time, that is, in terms of
number of paragraphs, sentences or words spoken, and not in relative terms, such as
the number of such structures related to an issue as a percentage of total expression.
Considering the above, this section has three aims: 1) Define a repeatable and
comparable measure of political agenda for the governments studied; 2) List the
different sources of information used in constructing these agendas; and 3) Describe
the complementary sources of information used in the subsequent sections’ econometric
specifications.
4.1. Primary Information Sources
Two types of information were used for the empirical approach. The first, cor-
responding to the composition of the political agenda, was made up of the set of
high priority issues for Colombian and US governments during the period August
7, 1998, to March 31, 2012. This set was created based on the classic definitions of
political agenda proposed by Baumgartner (2001) and Jones and Baumgartner (2005)
using presidential discourse as a reflection of the interest a government has in differ-
ent problems. The justification of this focus follows the work of Cohen (1995) and
Eshbaugh-Soha (2010) who argued that presidential discourse is an excellent source
of information for determining the value that a president places on different issues.
The starting point for deriving the different levels of attention, therefore, was the
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strategic behavior that the leaders displayed when using their words in public appear-
ances (Riker, 1996; Van Dijk, 2004, 2009). The elements of the political agenda were
defined based on the most frequently used words within their discourse. Specifically,
ak,gt = f
k,g
t /F
g
t was established as the level of attention that a government g pays to
a specific issue k at one point in time, where F gt is the total number of words used by
the president in his official appearances at time t, and fk,gt is the number of references
to issue k in these speeches. The political agenda of government g was thus defined
as:
Agt =
(
a1,gt , a
2,g
t , . . . , a
k,g
t
)
con a1,gt > a
2,g
t > . . . > a
k,g
t y
∑
k
ak,gt = 1(6)
Equally, aˇ was defined as the minimum level of interest for a topic to become part of
the political agenda; that is, the agenda “of interest” Aˆgt was redefined as:
Aˆgt =
{
ak,gt : a
k,g
t ∈ Agt y akt > aˇ
}
(7)
Some details had to be adjusted later in the formalization. For example, not all
words in the speeches were relevant for analyzing the importance of issues within the
speeches, such as proper nouns, diminutives and some acronyms. Likewise, there are
some expressions that do not add information relevant to the analysis, such as articles,
prepositions and words that are repeated often in spoken language. For this reason,
one of the interim processes consisted of filtering these types of expressions out of the
speeches. Tables B1 and B2 show the set of words that were excluded in each language
following the standard content analysis process proposed by Kippendorff (2004).
Hence, in a more detailed manner, the steps for constructing the agendas described
in (7) were as follows. Firstly, all available transcripts of official speeches given by
each Colombian and US president from 1998 to 2012 were downloaded, excluding in
all cases, statements that did not make reference to public intervention of heads of
state7. Secondly, the speeches were put into chronological order, identifying in the
process the exact day and the length of the speech in words.
Afterwards, each expression used by the presidents in these public appearances
was counted with the help of computational tools, using the algorithms developed
by Feinerer, Hornik and Meyer (2008), custom programming and specialized content-
analysis software. Finally, a time-series database was constructed, consisting of the
weekly frequency of each word extracted. Specifically, the series were calculated from
the following expressions:
fk,gt = φ
k,g
t × ln
(
N
nk
)
y F gt =
∑
k
fk,gt(8)
Where φk,gt is the number times word k appears in week t, N the number of speeches
that government g made during its term of office, and nk the total number of times that
the word k appeared in this time period. The formulation of this expression follows
the recommendations of Aas and Eikvil (1999) and Berry and Castellanos (2007) who
7See Appendix C: for detailed information about the sources of discursive information.
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suggested considering the frequency of each word by length of text, and the behavior
of these factors between speakers. The final step was to calculate the different ak,gt
defining the minimum level of weekly attention aˇ based on the expressions that appear
in at least 80% of speeches8. This limit permits extraction of only those issues that
were really repeated and important for each president studied.
The second type of information used was on US aid, obtained from annual reports
published by USAID in its Greenbook until 2010, and the most recent estimates
published at foreignassistance.gov for 2011 and 2012. The aid totals were recalculated
at 2010 constant prices and broken into quarters through a Spline-type interpolation.
The reason for this transformation is that, from a methodological point of view, the
quarterly calculation allows us to obtain an estimate of the amounts executed at
different times of the year. This information, which is not published in its totality
by USAID, is vital for the agenda analysis proposed in this paper as the process of
deploying these resources throughout the year may influence the governments’ political
agendas9.
4.2. Agenda for Terror and Drugs
Following on from the process described above, it is possible to study the behavior
of different elements within the political agenda. In fact, definitions (6) and (7) allow
the study of different levels of agenda aggregation. For example, if we establish that
an issue k¯ is composed of a set N of keywords, it is simple to construct a new base
level for k¯, as ak¯,gt =
∑
k∈N a
k,g
t .
Taking into account the above, and that the empirical strategy will focus on the
analysis of only two issues, drugs and terrorism, we define the Colombian agenda to
be studied as:
Aˆcolt ={∑i acol,it ,∑j acol,jt } con
{
i ∈ {Terrorismo, Terrorista, Terroristas, Terror}
j ∈ {Drogas, Droga, Narcotra´fico, Coca}(9)
While in the case of the USA it is defined as:
Aˆusat ={∑i ausa,it ,∑j ausa,jt } con
{
i ∈ {Terrorism, Terrorist, Terrorists, Terror}
j ∈ {Drugs, Drug, Narcotics, Cocaine}(10)
To determine the expressions above the following exercise was conducted. A
search was undertaken for words directly related to the expressions “Terrorismo”,
“Terrorism”, “Drogas”, and “Drugs” that also had a high concurrence with each of the
study topics over time and whose meaning was unequivocal within each speech.
4.3. Additional Information
Finally, to study the behavior of the agendas above it was necessary to use an
analysis that incorporated a series of variables that could help to explain variations
8In general this threshold corresponded to ak,gt = 0.75% of average attention per week.
9All USAID projects without exception must make quarterly progress reports both execution and results. However,
as discussed, this quarterly information is not published in full by USAID.
13
on this behavior over time. General information about international terrorist attacks
was obtained from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses
to Terrorism (START) database10. Similarly, information was taken from the Ob-
servatorio de Drogas de Colombia (ODC) and the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime (UNDOC) on the different variables associated with the problem of drug
trafficking inside and outside the country. The variables used are listed in the different
econometric estimates proposed in the next section.
5. Empirical Strategy
The purpose of this section is to quantitatively study the results of the theoretical
model developed in Section II. The econometric models are described as well as the
specific uses of the variables constructed in the previous section.
5.1. Baseline Model
The identification strategies proposed in this section take advantage of the varia-
tion over time in the level of attention given by Colombian and US presidents to drugs
and terrorism. This variation, along with the evolution of US aid in recent years, allows
us to estimate the impact of the deployment of aid resources and the US rhetoric on
the proportion of Colombian discourse that covers these problems. Specifically, the
empirical strategy has the following regression model as its baseline estimation:
ak,colt = c+mj + αi + tαi + β0AidCol
k
t + β1a
k,usa
[s,t] + t(11)
Where ak,colt represents the Colombian presidential attention
11 in week t on issue k
(Drugs or Terrorism), while ak,usa[s,t] represents the level of attention paid by US leaders
to the same topic over the past s weeks. Similarly, AidColkt is defined as the value of
aid (economic or military) provided by the US to Colombia with respect to the issues
studied. Consequently, the parameters of interest are β0 and β1 , which respectively
describe the effect of US aid and attention on the composition of the Colombian
political agenda.
The estimates also consider fixed effects of month mj since official appearances,
discourse and, in turn, our measure of presidential attention, depend to a great degree
on the time of year observed. For example, in December and January, presidential
activity tends to decrease because of the relatively long official recess, while in July and
August, discourse increases considerably as a result of the most important national
celebrations in both countries and the inauguration of the Colombian congress every 4
years. Furthermore, as patterns of attention differ between leaders, the model includes
fixed effects of the president αi and different tendencies for each Colombian leader
represented by tαi. These control flexibly for possible changes in presidential rhetoric
over time.
10Available at: http://www.start.umd.edu
11Here ak,colt =
∑
n a
col,n
t and a
k,usa
t =
∑
n a
usa,n
t with n defined according to (9) and (10)
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5.2. Effect of Other Observables
Aside from the variables proposed in the base model, there are many others that
may determine whether a president makes statements about drugs or terrorism. Some
of these, even when observable, are difficult to measure and depend on the point in
time when they are analyzed. However, it is desirable to control the results of our
model for short-term factors that may skew the estimates of β0 and β1. The factors
may be diverse, but in this particular case it is interesting to analyze whether the
results obtained in (11) are robust to controlling for short-term variables in the drug
market or the security situation nationally and internationally.
The composition of the set of observables included in the base model depends
on the issue being analyzed. Nevertheless, in general terms the regression model can
be rewritten as:
ak,colt = c+mj + αi + tαi + β0AidCol
k
t + β1a
k,usa
[s,t] + X
k
t Θ
k + t(12)
Where Θk is the vector of coefficients for each of the variables of Xkt that are defined
in detail below:
Controls for the Topic of Terror: Here, the vector Xkt consists of four variables:
1) The number of terrorist attacks per week in Colombia12; 2) The number of deaths
resulting from these attacks; 3) The number of terrorist incidents worldwide, excluding
Colombia; and 4) The interaction between the number of terrorist incidents and the
number of deaths as a result of these incidents in Colombia. All these variables control
for possible changes in attention as a result of situations directly related to terrorist
activity that force leaders to talk about the topic in some way, whether this is simply
due to the fact that the events occurred or because they have worsened.
Controls for the Topic of Drugs: In this case Xkt includes: 1) The number of
hectares of coca grown annually in Colombia; 2) The average price per kilogram of
cocaine in the international market; 3) The number of hectares eradicated per year
in the country; and 4) The average price per kilogram of cocaine nationally. All these
variables provide control for the president’s changing response to the drug problem.
5.3. Presidential Relationships and Ideological Coincidences
It is possible that influence on the agenda is differentiated not only between
Colombian presidents, but also by the different relationships that they have had with
US presidents. In fact, the influence on political agendas may depend on an “accidental”
political alignment between the leaders of both countries, and not on a consistent
relationship between US aid and Colombian presidential attention over time. In order
to control for these possible ideological coincidences and specific characteristics of
Colombian leaders, the following regression model was also estimated:
ak,colt = c+mj + v` + tv` + β0AidCol
k
t + β1a
k,usa
[s,t] + X
k
t Θ
k + t(13)
12According to START: a terrorist attack is the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state
actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation. For details of
specific coding of these events see: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/using-gtd/
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Where v` represents the fixed effects of presidential relationships, allowing control
for possible coincidences mentioned above and for specific tendencies in each period.
Figure 2 shows a schema for identifying the fixed effects of a president and presidential
relationships.
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Pastrana
Uribe I
Uribe II
Santos
↵1
↵2
↵3
↵4
v1
v2
v3
v4 v6
v5
Clinton
Bush
Bush
Bush
Obama
Obama
Figure 2. Presidential Relationships and Presidential Terms - Fixed Effects
5.4. Unobservable Factors and Foreign Aid Selection Bias
One element that has not been discussed until this point is the unobserved ability
of governments that receive foreign aid to encourage the allocation of these resources
to the country. Consequently, the efforts or lobbying of local governments to secure this
type of resource abroad have not been taken into account. It is essential to incorporate
this element into the analysis, and it has immediate consequences for the estimates
of the models.
Until now, we have assumed that the distribution of US aid is not affected by the
level of attention that Colombian presidents assigned to different issues and, thus, the
parameters of interest (β0 and β1 ) are unbiased if estimated under a model by ordinary
least squares (OLS). However, it can be argued that the variation in aid amounts seen
in the diagram (3) are not linked to behavior independent of US foreign policy, and
are rather a natural response to the constant lobbying of Colombian presidents in
their efforts to secure military and economic assistance for different problems.
In fact, studies such as those of Borda (2010) argue that this may have been
exactly the case during A´lvaro Uribe Ve´lez’s administration when, according to the
author, Colombia was able to “internationalize” the armed conflict thanks to the
foreign affairs dealings of its diplomatic corps and the highly propitious circumstances
presented by the international situation after September 11, 2001.
Considering the above, and the problem that this possible endogeneity of aid
represents for the identification of interest coefficients, the exogenous variation of US
aid will be determined using an estimation by instrumental variables. The two following
subsections focus on detailing the process realized in order to produce an unbiased
estimate of the coefficients β0 and β1. This is done using a more complete model that
includes all controls, fixed effects of the month, tendencies that differ depending on
presidential relationships, and the fixed effects of each presidential relationship.
Specification for “Terrorism”: In the agenda that corresponds to terror, the
problem of endogeneity was dealt with through a model in two stages, using the value
of US assistance directed at non-Latin American countries as an instrument for aid.
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This instrument has been successfully used in studies such as Dube and Naidu (2010),
which evaluated the effects of US military aid on the armed conflict in Colombia.
Furthermore it is particularly interesting to implement in this context, given the
exogeneity of the dynamic of US foreign policy with respect to the influence that
Colombian presidents can have over the management of resources aimed at other
countries outside the region. In this way the equation estimated as the first stage of
the model is:
AidColterrt = c+mj + v` + tv` + η0AidNoLatt + η1a
terr,usa
[s,t] + X
k
t Φ
k + et(14)
Where AidNoLatt refers to total aid, military or economic, directed towards non-Latin
American countries, and AidColterrt represents the aid directed towards Colombia
13,
excluding all resources allocated specifically to the fight against drugs. The second
stage of the model is estimated as follows:
aterr,colt = c+mj + v` + tv` + β0
̂AidColterrt + β1a
terr,usa
[s,t] + X
k
t Θ
k + t(15)
Where ̂AidColterrt predicts the aid obtained from the model estimated in (14)
Specification for “Drugs”: The procedure for handling the endogeneity in drug-
related topics is similar to that used for terrorism. The first stage is given by:
AidColdrugt = c+mj + v` + tv` + η0AidNoLatt + η1a
drug,usa
[s,t] + X
k
t Φ
k + et(16)
Where AidNoLatt represents, as in the previous instance, the total aid, military or
economic, directed towards non-Latin American countries, and AidColdrugt consists of
assistance directed towards Colombia, including resources solely allocated to the fight
against drugs. The second stage is therefore:
aterr,drugt = c+mj + v` + tv` + β0
̂AidColdrugt + β1a
drug,usa
[s,t] + X
k
t Θ
k + t(17)
Where ̂AidColdrugt predicts the aid obtained from the model estimated in (16).
5.5. Interpretation of Coefficients According to the Theoretical Model
According to the results obtained in the previous estimates, the interpretation
of the interest parameters (β0 and β1) is as follows: Firstly, if β0 is positive and
significant while β1 is not, it holds that agenda-setting is only possible through the
first mechanism proposed by the theoretical model, that is, through an increase in
incentives for the recipient government to benefit from aid deployed. Secondly, in the
situation where β1 is positive while β0 is not, it is taken that agenda-setting occurs
through reducing the costs of publicly addressing an issue (or legitimizing the agenda)
and not through the implementation of the aid itself. Finally, when β0 and β1 are
positive, this is taken as evidence in favor of the existence of both channels for relations
between Colombia and the US.
13It is worth taking into account that as of 2002 the US congress approved a new economic aid category called
“Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related”. Previously, all military and economic aid was associated
with drug-related issues as can be seen in Figure 3.
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6. Descriptive Statistics
6.1. Agenda Formation
Tables 1, 2 and 3 for Colombia and 4, 5 and 6 for the US show a summary of
the 200 most important elements of the political agenda for each government studied,
using the methodology presented in section IV.
The results for Colombia are interesting and consistent with the actual make-
up of the agendas. The importance of each issue, measured by the relative size of
the expressions in each word cloud, shows the patterns expected. For example, the
Pastrana administration included an important platform component dedicated to
peace and another dedicated to economic problems stemming from the crisis in 1999,
as well as a clear emphasis on issues of security, corruption, violence and drugs. In the
case of the two Uribe governments, characterized by the fight against illegal armed
groups and the legitimizing of these actions through a government program based on
national security (Seguridad Democra´tica), the results of the methodology are also
satisfactory. The most relevant elements highlighted by the process indicate that issues
of Security, Investor Confidence and attention to terrorism take precedence14.
In the case of the USA, the pattern is similar, revealing a structural difference
between Democrat and Republican administrations, the former giving more weight to
social issues and the latter emphasizing issues of foreign policy and security.
Finally, all tables show the importance of the two topics analyzed throughout this
paper (Drugs and Terrorism), either because they appear explicitly (high frequency)
or because of implicit reference in speeches (high frequency of expressions strongly
linked with these topics).
6.2. Selected Agendas and Characteristics of Short-term Circumstances
Table 7 shows the descriptive statistics of the data used in the estimates for
Colombia and the USA. In general terms it is worth highlighting the following: 1)
The relative weight of problems in the agenda is greater for US governments than for
Colombian governments. 2) The average aid against drugs in Colombia is grater than
the average aid for all non-Latin American countries. And 3) The number of terrorist
attacks in Colombia corresponds to 6% of the total attacks that occurred worldwide15.
7. Results
This section reports the estimates of the models proposed in the empirical strategy.
The results were analyzed in the framework of the theoretical model put forward in
section 2, explaining the arguments that allow us to reconcile the findings of both
approaches.
14Although this government claimed that it emphasized security, investor confidence and social cohesion, the last
element does not appear to form part of the actual presidential agenda in these periods, at least under the methodological
focus proposed here.
15Based on the descriptive statistics table: e
0.7270
e3.5307
= 0.06
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7.1. Graphical Analysis
The three graphs shown below summarize the main findings of this research.
Figure 4 shows the correspondence between the military aid logarithm and the per-
centage of Colombian presidential discourse dedicated to terrorism and drugs (fig. 4a
and fig. 4b respectively), suggesting a positive relationship between the amount of
military aid deployed in the country and the government’s interest in attending to
this type of problem. Although in the case of drugs the relationship is not as clear, the
econometric results presented below show that this relationship is significant. Figures
5a and 5b divide this correspondence into different presidential periods, showing the
type of dynamics that explain the effect of aid indicated in figure 4. Finally, figure 6
describes the comovement of the series of presidential attention in both countries for
the issues mentioned, revealing a time lag of approximately 4 weeks.
In light of the above, the aim henceforth will be to argue how the relationships
observed in the graphs shown are consistent with the direction expected by the theo-
retical model, once a set of possible alternative hypotheses are discounted.
7.2. Baseline Model, Presidential Relationships and Other Observables
The estimates by ordinary least squares of the baseline model can be observed in
tables 8 and 9, which are divided into groups according to the specification proposed
in (13). Specifically, the first group of estimates, composed of columns 1 to 5, allows
us to analyze the impact of US military aid and attention, considering the average
effect of these variables within each presidential term. The second group, composed
of columns 6 to 10, allows us to study the magnitude of this effect within the six
presidential relationships of figure 2.
For the “terror” agenda, the coefficients of interest are as expected. In columns 2
to 5 of table 8, both military aid and US attention on terrorism are shown equally to
have a positive and significant effect on the proportion of the Colombian agenda dedi-
cated to terror. This relationship is consistent between specifications, even controlling
for possible deviations of presidential attention caused by local terrorist attacks (Col
2), international terrorist activity (Col 3), deaths in national attacks (Col 4) and the
intensity of terrorist activity in Colombia (Col 5). This final measure is the interaction
between the number of local attacks and the number of deaths they cause.
Specifically, the estimates show that with a 1% increase in US military aid, there
is a 1.17% increase in Colombian presidential attention on “terror”. Likewise, it can
be observed that an increase of one standard deviation16 in US attention on this issue
represents an increase of 0.1 standard deviations in the proportion of the Colombian
agenda dedicated to terrorism.
With respect to the coefficients reported for “drugs” in table 9, similar results are
found. Columns (2)-(5) show how anti-narcotics military aid and US attention on re-
lated issues raised the interest of Colombian leadership on the drug topic. For example,
a 1% increase in military aid totals allocated to the fight against drugs represented an
average growth of 0.76% in the interest towards these issues for the period 1998-2012.
Meanwhile, an increase of 1 standard deviation in US attention corresponded to an
increase of 0.15 standard deviations17 in the proportion of the presidential agenda
16Standard Deviation of US attention on terrorism = 0.1301 thus 0.1301× 0.0052/0.0075 ≈ 0.1
17Standard Deviation of US attention on drugs = 0.0375 thus 0.0375× 0.0166/0.0042 ≈ 0.15
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dedicated to this problem. These effects are shown to be consistent in all columns of
the first group of estimates, even when controlled for different determinants from the
fight against drugs, such as prices per kilogram in national and international markets
(Col 2 to 4) and coca planting and eradication activities in the country (Col 3 to 5).
The reason for including the previous control variables, apart from those men-
tioned in the empirical strategy, is that attention to drugs may increase precisely
at those moments when drug trafficking is most profitable and, consequently, more
problematic for the government. In all the specifications stated above the price of
cocaine and the number of hectares eradicated, as proxies of the profitability of the
business at a local level, are relevant variables for explaining the proportion of the
agenda focused on drugs. The total area of crops, in contrast, does not appear to be
a consistent factor throughout the regression models.
With respect to the second group of estimates in tables 8 and 9 (Columns 6 to
10), it must be noted that the effect of military aid is significantly greater if there are
controls in place for possible ideological coincidences between presidents. In particular,
in the case of table 8, a 1% increase in military aid corresponds to an increase of 1.5%
in terrorism awareness, while in the case of drugs; a 1% increase in military aid gives
rise to a 0.97% increase in attention paid to this issue.
7.3. Foreign Aid Selection Bias
As mentioned in the empirical strategy, there are concerns over the endogeneity
of foreign aid with respect to the agenda-forming process, whether through the chan-
nel of internationalizing the conflict or through presidential lobbying in foreign aid
institutions. However, the coefficients reported in tables 8 and 9 offer some reassurance
with respect to this problem. Given the results of the exercise it is highly unlikely
that variables have been omitted which explain part of the effects found. In fact, the
behavior of the parameters of interest is very stable between specifications and do not
change significantly when including the controls directly related to the issues studied.
Nevertheless, to completely discount the problem of endogeneity and be sure of
the results, two estimates were created using the instrumental variables reported in
tables 10 and 11, where the main results of this empirical approach are found. The
coefficients reported confirm the power that US governments had to intervene in the
formation of the Colombian political agenda, even when this power is studied based
on the exogenous variation of resources transferred from the US towards Colombia.
After estimating through the instrumental variables and taking into account the
average internal effect of each presidential relationship, a 1% increase in military aid
was linked to an average increase of 2.32% in the percentage of Colombian presidential
discourse focused on terrorism. Meanwhile, a 1% increase in the levels of military aid
in the fight against drugs was linked to an average increase of 1.73% in the levels of
attention to this problem.
Similarly, the proportion of US discourse dedicated to drugs and terror displayed
a significant positive impact over the focus of the Colombian agenda in these areas.
An increase of 1 standard deviation in the attention given to terrorism and drugs
saw increases of 0.17 and 0.16 standard deviations18 respectively in the Colombian
presidential attention related to these issues.
18Following the previous process: 0.1301× 0.0101/0.0075 ≈ 0.17 and 0.0375× 0.0186/0.0042 ≈ 0.16
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Note that column 6 of tables 10 and 11 also shows the effect without controlling for
presidential relations in order to compare differences between mandates and between
the different presidential interactions proposed in the empirical strategy. The effects of
the most stringent estimates are slightly smaller in all models, but equally significant
for military and US attention.
7.4. Robustness and Additional Exercises
Falsification Test using Economic Aid: According to proposition 1, political
agenda-setting through foreign aid is only possible if there are opportunities for the
recipient government to benefit from the deployment of those resources. In the case
of military aid this possibility more apparent since the process that the receiving
government uses to obtain benefits is simpler. The government as legitimate owner of
the country’s armed forces can claim any military result within its borders regardless
of the resources that made that result possible. In the case of economic aid, however,
the context is different. Given the restrictions that USAID places on its projects, the
deployment of economic aid involves a series of intermediaries such as NGOs and
multilateral organizations, making rent-extraction a difficult task. This is due to the
fact that in this type of aid the organizations involved can directly claim the results
of the projects.
Consequently, it is expected that for this type of aid, unlike military aid, the
agenda-setting effects of deploying these funds tend towards zero. To prove this in
the case of Colombia, the exercise developed in the previous is repeated, studying the
effect of economic (and not military) aid on the Colombian agenda. Tables 12, 13 and
14 describe this exercise.
As expected, no significant results were obtained in any specification. This allows
us to conclude that the agenda-setting mechanism operates based on military influence
and not economic aid. The result is consistent with the findings of Goldsmith, Horiuchi
and Inoguchi (2005) who, upon evaluating the effect of economic aid on the political
agenda of different recipient countries, did not obtain significant results regarding the
influence of this type of aid.
Domestic Policy Effort: A concern with respect to the results of the base
model is the lack of a measure of policy effort on the part of the Colombian government.
It could be argued that the effect of agenda-setting does not depend on the sums
received but on how they relate to the resources allocated domestically to combat
each problem. It is possible that during the years when the US subsidized a large part
of the total fight against terrorism and drugs, agenda-setting was stronger. Figure
8 shows the evolution of Colombian spending on the two topics studied here. Using
these figures, the base model was modified in such a way that the aid received would
be weighted for the actual spending of the Colombian government. The results of this
modification are shown in Tables 17,18,19 and 20. A fall in the value of coefficients
can be seen, as expected, but in any case they report a positive and significant effect of
US aid on both attention to terrorism and attention to drugs. Thus, after estimating
the regressions with the aid weighted, there is still evidence in favor of agenda-setting
power through US aid.
It is worth highlighting that the estimates given by instrumental variables are
not completely robust to this new change given that the instrument only helps explain
exogenous variation of the numerator of the new independent variable. Furthermore a
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new problem of endogeneity could exist given that local policies tend to be accompanied
by domestic changes to attention. However, the exercise is helpful in showing the
important role domestic policy plays in these results and also prompts the following
exercise.
The Influence of Spending: Based on anecdotal evidence in US congressional
debates, we know that the aid approved is often accompanied by particular recom-
mendations and political commitments for the receiving country. During the Uribe
Ve´lez administration in Colombia, it was necessary to create a wealth tax that would
demonstrate the serious intentions of the local government to jointly support the US
policies against terrorism and drugs. Part of agenda-setting may therefore owe itself to
corresponding efforts by the local government not only through focusing attention on
these issues but also by increasing spending in areas that receive US support. Table
22 displays an exercise where this kind of corresponding effort can be seen. We can
observe that, controlling for different ideological coincidences and short-term trends,
a 1% increase in US aid results in an increase of 4.2% and 8.2% in public spending
against terrorism and drugs respectively. This result allows us to make a preliminary
conclusion about the existence of a direct effect on public spending as a consequence
of receiving foreign aid.
Test for Instrument Orthogonality: : A required test for validating the
instruments used in the estimates is the proof of the joint independence of the instru-
ments. That is, we do not expect that the instrument used to capture the exogenous
variation of aid against drugs to have any predictive power regarding the amount of
anti-terrorism aid allocated to Colombia. Furthermore, the instrument used to capture
the exogenous variation of aid against terrorism must not have any power to predict
the amount of anti-drug aid allocated to Colombia. Table 21 shows that swapping the
instruments does not produce any predictive ability and therefore is evidence of the
instruments’ orthogonality.
7.5. Regarding different estimation methods
It is worth taking into account that there are some differences between Two-stage
least squares (2SLS) and Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations. Given that the
bias by endogeneity that was argued had to be positive (more government attention
locally implied more foreign aid), it was expected that the estimates by instrumental
variables would show adjusted coefficients lower than those reported by OLS. Despite
this, it is not surprising that the coefficients by 2SLS are greater than those of OLS
given that the aid variable may be subject to the classic problem of measurement error,
which in this case is more apparent given the quarterly approach to aid deployment.
For this reason, it is possible we are facing a case of endogeneity by measurement
error (attenuation bias) rather than a problem of bias by inverse causality between
the variables of aid and government attention.
7.6. Comments About the First Stages
The estimates made in Panel B of tables 10 and 11 are vital to understanding the
dynamic of US aid. Through these specifications we can observe a “substitution” effect
between military aid granted to non-Latin American countries and the assistance of
this sort directed towards Colombia. Note that regardless of the formulation or the
issue studied, Colombian military aid has a negative relationship with respect to the
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aid directed to other non-Latin American countries. This can be understood as a
result of the US government’s budget restrictions where, given a maximum amount
of resources approved by congress, it must redistribute the aid between the possible
recipient governments based on its foreign policy.
Perhaps more interesting than the aid substitution mechanism is the irrelevance
shown by the terrorist dynamic when explaining the sums of military aid given to
Colombia. For example, in table 10, no model shows evidence that terrorist attacks
or their intensity has an effect on the military aid given to the country. In the case
of aid to help fight drugs, on the other hand, table 11 shows a clear link between
the number of hectares cultivated and the quantity or resources sent to combat the
potential consequences of these crops growing.
Finally, it is worth noting that throughout all of the estimates, total military
aid directed to non-Latin American countries appears to be a strong instrument
of the aid directed to Colombia. For all specifications the first stages exceed the
standard condition of statistics F greater than 10. Similarly, identification tests showed
satisfactory results even in more restrictive models given by columns 5 and 6 in both
tables.
7.7. Mechanisms and Some Comments about the Theoretical Model
As shown by the model developed in section 2, the empirical results can be inter-
preted as evidence in favor of agenda influence through the two mechanisms proposed
by propositions 1 and 2. Particularly in the case of military aid, the Colombian gov-
ernment was able to benefit from the results of the aid resources being deployed. In
the two problems analyzed, increases in military aid imply more troops to face these
problems, which improves the chances of securing positive results against these two
serious problems and ultimately providing access to the political benefits of claiming
operational success for these issues.
For example, during the peaks of military aid that occurred in 2000-2001 and
2003-2004, the governments of presidents A´lvaro Uribe and Andre´s Pastrana reported
attention indexes greater than the average for other years of their term of office.
Table 15 displays the results of a simple mean difference between these periods and
others within each presidential term. What is shown is the behavior described by the
theoretical model: the higher the level of aid secured, the higher the level of attention
on the issues receiving aid. However, is this increased attention the only consequence
of such rent-seeking? To answer this question it is worth analyzing the dynamic of
presidential interest for those issues in the context where they originated. For example,
selecting two representative speeches from these years (2000 and 2004) we find the
following:
President Andre´s Pastrana Arango: July 22, 2000, during the awarding of the Order of Naval Merit
“Almirante Padilla” a few days after the visit of Bill Clinton to the country:
“...The results obtained in the framework of the Maritime Agreement are extremely satisfying: this year
they have inspected 148 vessels and seized almost 19 tons of cocaine that, if it had reached US streets,
would have left the drug traffickers with an income of close to five hundred million dollars”...“These
boats are part of the Cooperation Program between the Colombian and United States governments that
seeks to unite our efforts in the fight against the trafficking of illegal drugs. A few days ago, President
Clinton himself said the same thing on approving the aid for Plan Colombia: “As Colombians fight
to build their democracy and block the illegal drug trade, they are fighting for all of us”.
These words have great value for Colombians, as they are the essence of the joint work our two nations
are doing in the name of better social justice and a world free of the international drug problem. I
would like to especially thank the joint work of Ambassador Curtis Kamman and Admiral James Loy,
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Commandant of the US Coast Guard and Chief of Interdiction, who have been the promoters and the
architects of the transfer of these two units”... “All of these statistics are the best proof of Colombia
and its navy’s commitment in the fight against the worldwide problem of drugs.”
The type of discourse that accompanied the US aid after the approval of Plan
Colombia can be seen here. Talking about results against drugs seemed to improve
the president’s image among the national and international communities. Similarly,
the following was seen in the case of president A´lvaro Uribe:
President A´lvaro Uribe Ve´lez: November 22, 2004, during the visit of President George W. Bush to
the country:
“...While the Colombian people fight for democracy, terrorism has assassinated democratic fighters.”...
“While the Colombian army destroys anti-personnel mines and gives the world an example of facing
the terrorist challenge while observing human rights, terrorism has affected 600 Colombians in the
past year, especially members of the security forces, with anti-personnel mines. The drugs that finance
terrorism threaten to destroy the Amazon rainforest. It already attempted to do so by eliminating
one million seven hundred thousand hectares of tropical forest in Colombia” ... US aid has gone
beyond mere words to become an effective support. We trust that the United States and
President Bush will continue to help until Colombia is free of the plague of terrorism
and drugs. We cannot leave the job half done, we are going to win but we haven’t won yet. We
have advanced but the snake is still alive” ... “The role of the United States in the battle against
terrorism, and in the respect and tolerant debate of opposing ideas, is essential for governability in
this continent”.
It is even clearer that attention towards terrorism was directly linked to the sums
of aid organized by the US, and that based on these they could obtain political benefits
from their deployment. It is evident that it was not only rent-seeking that caused
this behavior, but also the context in which it presented itself. As can be observed in
these small extracts, it is not a coincidence that the most important sums of aid and
the highest levels of attention coincided with the US presidents’ visits to the country,
when it is easier to show people the importance of focusing attention on this type of
problem.
These small samples of speeches also show the benefits for the US of “putting its
money where its mouth is”, not only in a domestic context but also for the international
community which, as shown in the model, is a key factor in agenda-setting mechanisms.
If it is true that the agenda-setting process is stronger when the possibility of
benefiting is greater for the receiving government (In the model δk → 1), then faced
with an increase in these possibilities we should also expect an increase in the effect
studied. To explore this mechanism the following exercise was conducted. The base
model was estimated without fixed effects for each year from 1998 until 2012 and the
effects (β0 and β1) were taken for each year as a dependent variable on the annual
change in the Corruption Perceptions Index published by Transparency International.
The index ranges from 0 to 10 (where 0 is a totally corrupt country and 10 is
a country with no corruption), and its changing value works as an estimate of the
parameter δk. In years when perceived corruption increases it is to be expected that
the possibility for additional political rent-seeking δk is greater and the estimated
effects of political agenda-setting should be larger.
The exercise mentioned above is shown in Figure 7. The relation obtained is as
expected: at higher levels of growth in the perception of corruption, the effects found
in the regressions are larger, and this relationship is consistently positive for the two
issues studied. This suggests that the power to set the agenda is stronger when there
is an increased possibility of the recipient governments obtaining additional political
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rents. Table 16 shows the numerical correlations reported in Figure 7 through the
solid line.
Finally, the fact that the US attention is consistently important for explaining
variations in Colombian attention can be interpreted in light of the model as the
effective existence of a channel for agenda-setting through reducing the costs of making
public statements. In the case of terrorism and drugs, US intervention has enabled these
topics to be discussed in an international political context, and provided incentives
for Colombia to address these problems. (For more detailed developments see Easterly
(2002); Haas (1980); Karlan and Appel (2011); Riker (1996))
8. Conclusions
In this paper, international aid is examined as a tool for political agenda-setting.
For this analysis, a theoretical model is constructed that incorporates the positive
externalities generated by foreign aid on the political benefits of the governments that
receive the aid, as well as the compensation provided by these governments through
the legitimization of the donor countries’ political agendas.
The main results of the model show that government that offer international
assistance can influence the political agenda of the recipient governments through two
channels: First, by reducing the political costs of official intervention in financed issues
(as a consequence of the increase in international relevance of the issues receiving aid);
and second, by creating incentives for additional political rent-seeking, when there
is a positive fraction of resources that the government can benefit from directly or
indirectly.
These results are studied for the case of the aid provided by the USA to Colombia
during the period 1998-2012, and this shows the power US presidents had to influence
the Colombian political agenda in matters related to drugs and terrorism. It is found
that military aid, and not economic aid, is responsible for linking the two countries’
agendas. The results are obtained using an estimation by instrumental variables that
capture the exogenous variation of the aid directed to Colombia based on the aid
provided to non-Latin American countries.
The conclusions are robust to controlling for different short-term characteristics
and variables associated with terrorist and drug-related activities, in Colombia and
the world.
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Figure 4. Military aid and presidential rhetoric on terrorism and drugs
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Figure 5. Military Aid and Presidential Speeches about Terrorism and Drugs
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Table 1—Summary: Agenda and Word Correlations - President Pastrana
Word Correlations with“Drogas”
il´ıcitas 0.81 cultivos 0.40 conferencia 0.31 cooperacio´n 0.24
tra´fico 0.76 erradicacio´n 0.38 dan˜o 0.31 creado 0.24
problema 0.66 toneladas 0.38 colombia 0.29 naciones 0.24
qu´ımicos 0.66 estados 0.37 objetivos 0.29 reiterar 0.24
consumo 0.61 sufrido 0.37 derrotar 0.28 comunidad 0.23
flagelo 0.60 prevencio´n 0.36 laboratorios 0.28 cultivo 0.23
droga 0.57 combatir 0.35 amenaza 0.27 duradera 0.23
lucha 0.53 unidos 0.35 internacional 0.27 enemigo 0.23
mundial 0.49 a´reas 0.35 compartida 0.25 plan 0.23
narcotra´fico 0.49 alternativo 0.33 estrategia 0.25 territorio 0.23
il´ıcitos 0.48 fortalecimiento 0.33 negocio 0.25 activos 0.22
coca 0.44 mundo 0.32 reduccio´n 0.25 continente 0.22
Note: The word cloud shows the two hundred most frequent expressions used by the president throughout his term
in office. Font size of words is proportional to its frequency in the speech. The first 48 correlations with “drogas” are
shown in the table.
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Table 2—Summary: Agenda and Word Correlations - President Uribe
Word Correlations with “Terrorismo”
terroristas 0.66 pueblo 0.39 polic´ıas 0.34 acciones 0.31
derrotar 0.56 seguridad 0.38 respeto 0.34 ca´rcel 0.31
terrorista 0.48 determinacio´n 0.37 farc 0.33 defensa 0.31
democracia 0.45 colombia 0.36 humanitario 0.33 guerrilla 0.31
grupos 0.44 pu´blica 0.36 nombre 0.33 polic´ıa 0.31
democra´tica 0.43 soldados 0.36 armas 0.32 toda 0.31
paz 0.43 lucha 0.35 democra´tico 0.32 grupo 0.30
amenaza 0.42 narcotra´fico 0.35 firmeza 0.32 guerrillas 0.30
derrota 0.42 desaf´ıo 0.34 fuerzas 0.32 oposicio´n 0.30
fuerza 0.42 guerrilleros 0.34 garant´ıas 0.32 pol´ıtica 0.30
integrantes 0.41 libertades 0.34 militares 0.32 violentos 0.30
militar 0.41 patria 0.34 secuestro 0.32 voluntad 0.30
Word Correlations with“Drogas”
il´ıcitas 0.78 colombia 0.25 mundo 0.21 preservar 0.17
droga 0.50 guardabosques 0.25 narcotra´fico 0.21 riqueza 0.17
consumo 0.45 hecta´reas 0.25 territorio 0.21 terrorismo 0.17
tra´fico 0.39 personal 0.25 criminal 0.20 tristeza 0.17
erradicacio´n 0.33 criminalidad 0.24 consumidores 0.19 a´reas 0.17
libre 0.31 pa´ıses 0.24 destruccio´n 0.19 dan˜o 0.16
selva 0.31 bosque 0.23 internacional 0.19 dominio 0.16
libres 0.30 cultivos 0.23 milenio 0.19 erradicar 0.16
naciones 0.30 europa 0.23 disminuido 0.18 familias 0.16
negocio 0.30 lucha 0.23 global 0.18 terroristas 0.16
dosis 0.29 legislativo 0.22 europea 0.17 ciudadanos 0.15
unidas 0.27 hermanos 0.21 polic´ıa 0.17 coca 0.15
Note: The word cloud shows the two hundred most frequent expressions used by the president throughout his term
in office. Font size of words is proportional to its frequency in the speech. The first 48 correlations with “drogas” and
“Terrorismo” are shown in the table.
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Table 3—Summary: Agenda and Word Correlations - President Santos
Word Correlations with“Terrorismo”
actos 0,48 militar 0,28 seguiremos 0,24 alias 0,21
terroristas 0,48 conjunto 0,27 ceremonia 0,23 bandas 0,21
fuerzas 0,44 determinacio´n 0,27 consolidacio´n 0,23 eje´rcito 0,21
terrorista 0,44 comandante 0,26 farc 0,23 golpes 0,21
armadas 0,39 contundencia 0,26 seguir 0,23 guerra 0,21
civiles 0,33 defensa 0,26 sentirse 0,23 intervencio´n 0,21
comandantes 0,32 seguridad 0,26 colaboracio´n 0,22 narcotra´fico 0,21
militares 0,31 efectividad 0,24 combatir 0,22 resultados 0,21
oficial 0,3 general 0,24 guerrilla 0,22 criminales 0,2
patria 0,3 inteligencia 0,24 soldados 0,22 fuerza 0,2
oficiales 0,29 polic´ıa 0,24 u´nico 0,22 lucha 0,2
dado 0,28 polic´ıas 0,24 aire 0,21 mar 0,2
Word Correlations with“Drogas”
global 0.38 humanidad 0.24 regio´n 0.21 latinoamericanos 0.19
luchando 0.31 soldados 0.24 crimen 0.20 llegado 0.19
planeta 0.31 autoridad 0.23 enfoque 0.20 profunda 0.19
droga 0.30 ciudades 0.22 estados 0.20 tiempos 0.19
narcotra´fico 0.30 conviccio´n 0.22 guerrilleros 0.20 dignidad 0.18
tra´fico 0.30 cooperacio´n 0.22 latina 0.20 militares 0.18
armas 0.27 mundo 0.22 organizado 0.20 oficiales 0.18
eje´rcito 0.25 combatiendo 0.21 polic´ıas 0.20 pa´ıses 0.18
miembros 0.25 comprometidos 0.21 ame´rica 0.19 preocupa 0.18
naciones 0.25 generales 0.21 asamblea 0.19 puertas 0.18
centroame´rica 0.24 libertades 0.21 debemos 0.19 voz 0.18
dispuestos 0.24 lucha 0.21 estabilidad 0.19 aire 0.17
Notes: The word cloud shows the two hundred most frequent expressions used by the president throughout his term
in office. Font size of words is proportional to its frequency in the speech. The first 48 correlations with “drogas” and
“Terrorismo” are shown in the table.
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Table 4—Summary: Agenda and Word Correlations - President Clinton
Word Correlations with “Terrorism”
pursue 0.32 ability 0.23 respond 0.22 seek 0.21
destruction 0.29 answer 0.23 speech 0.22 strengthening 0.21
additional 0.27 complete 0.23 weapons 0.22 threats 0.21
mass 0.27 effect 0.23 biological 0.21 understanding 0.21
process 0.26 information 0.23 common 0.21 agreed 0.20
efforts 0.25 related 0.23 continue 0.21 chemical 0.20
international 0.25 relationship 0.23 encourage 0.21 continued 0.20
response 0.25 address 0.22 fight 0.21 directly 0.20
commitment 0.24 agenda 0.22 global 0.21 including 0.20
cooperation 0.24 meeting 0.22 joint 0.21 mutual 0.20
east 0.24 parties 0.22 middle 0.21 outside 0.20
threat 0.24 reforms 0.22 promoting 0.21 particular 0.20
Word Correlations with “Drugs”
drug 0.58 expand 0.21 strengthen 0.17 children 0.14
strategy 0.36 local 0.20 levels 0.16 committed 0.14
treatment 0.34 overall 0.20 nearly 0.16 crimes 0.14
crime 0.31 percent 0.20 progress 0.16 develop 0.14
streets 0.31 study 0.20 reduce 0.16 effective 0.14
cities 0.29 test 0.20 single 0.16 mexico 0.14
communities 0.28 criminal 0.18 expanded 0.15 radio 0.14
population 0.28 level 0.18 help 0.15 significant 0.14
positive 0.27 dramatically 0.17 police 0.15 trouble 0.14
fight 0.24 nation 0.17 powerful 0.15 basis 0.13
justice 0.23 rates 0.17 similar 0.15 borders 0.13
enforcement 0.21 safe 0.17 tools 0.15 community 0.13
Notes: The word cloud shows the two hundred most frequent expressions used by the president throughout his term
in office. Font size of words is proportional to its frequency in the speech. The first 48 correlations with “drugs” and
“Terrorism” are shown in the table.
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Table 5—Summary: Agenda and Word Correlations - President Bush
Word Correlations with “Terrorism”
terrorist 0.37 united 0.23 prime 0.20 governments 0.18
sharing 0.36 bush 0.22 relationship 0.20 joint 0.18
information 0.31 homeland 0.22 world 0.20 qaeda 0.18
fight 0.29 president 0.22 allies 0.19 september 0.18
terror 0.25 war 0.22 common 0.19 taliban 0.18
terrorists 0.25 minister 0.21 efforts 0.19 threats 0.18
agencies 0.24 attack 0.20 including 0.19 acts 0.17
attacks 0.24 coalition 0.20 peace 0.19 agreed 0.17
cooperation 0.24 countries 0.20 progress 0.19 bring 0.17
international 0.24 discussions 0.20 responsibilities 0.19 continue 0.17
security 0.24 fighting 0.20 threat 0.19 destruction 0.17
support 0.23 nations 0.20 afghanistan 0.18 east 0.17
Word Correlations with “Drugs”
drug 0.72 modern 0.26 affordable 0.18 percent 0.16
narcotics 0.53 plans 0.26 centers 0.18 system 0.16
cocaine 0.49 save 0.24 demand 0.18 america 0.15
seniors 0.49 choose 0.23 doctors 0.18 benefits 0.15
choices 0.33 help 0.23 plan 0.18 called 0.15
medicine 0.31 treatment 0.22 reduce 0.18 change 0.15
cost 0.30 choice 0.21 afford 0.17 giving 0.15
benefit 0.29 lives 0.19 citizens 0.17 options 0.15
care 0.29 lower 0.19 patients 0.17 people 0.15
costs 0.28 program 0.19 pay 0.17 reason 0.15
available 0.27 provide 0.19 savings 0.17 senior 0.15
health 0.27 receive 0.19 medical 0.16 talk 0.15
Notes: The word cloud shows the two hundred most frequent expressions used by the president throughout his term
in office. Font size of words is proportional to its frequency in the speech. The first 48 correlations with “drugs” and
“Terrorism” are shown in the table.
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Table 6—Summary: Agenda and Word Correlations - President Obama
Word Correlations with “Terrorism”
terrorist 0.55 defeat 0.36 partnership 0.30 actions 0.27
terrorists 0.51 effective 0.34 range 0.30 issues 0.27
violent 0.50 efforts 0.34 threats 0.30 partners 0.27
threat 0.45 preventing 0.34 nuclear 0.29 secure 0.27
qaeda 0.44 indeed 0.32 protect 0.29 unique 0.27
attacks 0.43 international 0.32 common 0.28 allies 0.26
security 0.42 prevent 0.32 framework 0.28 cooperation 0.26
homeland 0.37 resolve 0.32 including 0.28 individuals 0.26
partnerships 0.37 world 0.32 relationship 0.28 presidents 0.26
united 0.37 principles 0.31 respect 0.28 strong 0.26
violence 0.37 approach 0.30 rule 0.28 afghanistan 0.25
attack 0.36 countries 0.30 strategic 0.28 conflict 0.25
Word Correlations with “Drugs”
drug 0.77 enforcement 0.34 hospitals 0.31 hall 0.29
controls 0.58 paying 0.34 insurance 0.31 money 0.29
cocaine 0.45 system 0.34 pay 0.31 office 0.29
hole 0.44 benefits 0.33 reduce 0.31 people 0.29
seniors 0.44 cost 0.33 reducing 0.31 program 0.29
treatment 0.41 dollars 0.33 reform 0.31 amount 0.28
care 0.39 savings 0.33 chief 0.30 provide 0.28
doctor 0.39 condition 0.32 essentially 0.30 actually 0.27
medical 0.39 covered 0.32 getting 0.30 affordable 0.27
health 0.37 advantage 0.31 legitimate 0.30 called 0.27
costs 0.34 billion 0.31 premiums 0.30 control 0.27
doctors 0.34 cover 0.31 criminal 0.29 deal 0.27
Notes: The word cloud shows the two hundred most frequent expressions used by the president throughout his term
in office. Font size of words is proportional to its frequency in the speech. The first 48 correlations with “drugs” and
“Terrorism” are shown in the table.
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Table 10—IV Estimation: Presidential Attention to Terrorism on Military Aid 1998-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Second Stage, Dependent Variable: Presidential Attention to Terrorism
Military Aid - Terror† 0.0218*** 0.0225*** 0.0232*** 0.0232*** 0.0232*** 0.0262***
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0052)
US Attention - Terror 0.0080* 0.0091** 0.0101** 0.0101** 0.0101** 0.0147***
(0.0044) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0053)
Attacks-Colombiaa 0.0004 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Attacks-Worldwideb 0.0013** 0.0013** 0.0013** 0.0013**
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Deaths due to Attacksc 0.0001 0.0005 0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0009)
Attacks×Deaths -0.0004 -0.0001
(0.0006) (0.0007)
Panel B: First Stage, Dependent Variable: Military Aid without Assistance Against Drugs
Military Aid NonLat‡ -0.4086*** -0.4063*** -0.4037*** -0.4037*** -0.4038*** -0.3447***
(0.0196) (0.0201) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0243)
US Attention - Terror -0.3481*** -0.3554*** -0.3620*** -0.3620*** -0.3622*** -0.5304***
(0.0465) (0.0475) (0.0474) (0.0474) (0.0474) (0.0558)
Attacks-Colombiaa -0.0082 -0.0055 -0.0055 -0.0013 0.0032
(0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0057) (0.0064) (0.0094)
Attacks-Worldwideb -0.0117 -0.0117 -0.0115 -0.0049
(0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0103)
Deaths due to Attacksc -0.0001 0.0102 0.0192
(0.0032) (0.0109) (0.0182)
Attacks×Deaths -0.0087 -0.0204
(0.0086) (0.0139)
President Fixed Effects - - - - - X
Month Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Time Specific Trends X X X X X X
Pres. Relationship FE X X X X X -
Observations 702 637 637 637 637 637
R2 0.9230 0.9121 0.9126 0.9126 0.9128 0.8394
F 1178 751.3 724.3 694.1 669.2 459.6
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The terror agenda consists of the
fraction of speech dedicated to the following expressions: terrorismo + terrorista + terroristas + terror over the total
words that were said by the Colombian president in each instance omitting the set of words in tables B1 and B2. The
US Attention consist of the expressions Terrorism + Terrorist + Terrorists + Terror said in the last four weeks by US
presidents. † It Corresponds to Log(Military Assistance Without Drugs - Colombia) while (a), (b) y (c) are the log of
terrorist attacks in Colombia, the log of worldwide terrorist attacks excluding Colombia and the log of the number of
deaths due to terrorist attacks in Colombia, respectively. ‡ It is the log of Military Assistance to Non-Latin-American
Countries without the assistance against drugs).
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Table 11—IV Estimation: Presidential Attention to Drugs on Military Aid Against Drugs 1998-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Second Stage, Dependent Variable: Presidential Attention to Drugs
Military Aid - Drugs† 0.0163*** 0.0159*** 0.0174*** 0.0173*** 0.0173*** 0.0219***
(0.0049) (0.0047) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0054) (0.0078)
US Attention - Drugs 0.0219*** 0.0231*** 0.0220*** 0.0186*** 0.0186*** 0.0137*
(0.0072) (0.0074) (0.0069) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0070)
Intl.Pricea 0.0109 0.0200* 0.0138 0.0138 0.0108
(0.0086) (0.0120) (0.0118) (0.0119) (0.0119)
Cultivated Hectaresb -0.0073 -0.0084* -0.0084* -0.0137**
(0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0068)
Domestic Pricec 0.0255*** 0.0255*** 0.0255***
(0.0081) (0.0088) (0.0095)
Eradicated Hectaresd 0.0000 -0.0004
(0.0035) (0.0033)
Panel B: First Stage, Dependent Variable: Military Assistance Against Drugs
Military Aid NonLat‡ -0.3164*** -0.3225*** -0.2856*** -0.2855*** -0.2760*** -0.1794***
(0.0246) (0.0244) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0200) (0.0213)
US Attention - Drugs -0.1142 -0.1971 -0.0931 -0.0997 -0.1024 0.0879
(0.1297) (0.1338) (0.1122) (0.1120) (0.1130) (0.1333)
Intl.Pricea -0.5400*** -1.1960*** -1.2077*** -1.2384*** -1.1583***
(0.0920) (0.1053) (0.1122) (0.1129) (0.1026)
Cultivated Hectaresb 0.5723*** 0.5702*** 0.5487*** 0.7011***
(0.0408) (0.0414) (0.0434) (0.0424)
Domestic Pricec 0.0486 0.0013 -0.1030
(0.1122) (0.1278) (0.1748)
Eradicated Hectaresd -0.0712 -0.2085***
(0.0525) (0.0440)
President Fixed Effects - - - - - X
Month Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Time Specific Trends X X X X X X
Pres. Relationship FE X X X X X -
Observations 702 689 689 689 689 689
R2 0.8586 0.8577 0.9026 0.9026 0.9030 0.8388
F 659.2 470.6 697.7 723.2 917.3 843.8
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The Drugs agenda consists of the
fraction of speech dedicated to the following expressions: Droga + Drogas + Narcotra´fico + Coca over the total words
that were said by the Colombian president in each instance omitting the set of words in tables B1 and B2. The US
Attention consist of the expressions Drug + Drugs + Cocaine + Narcotics said in the last four weeks by US presidents.
† It Corresponds to Log(Military Assistance Against Drugs - Colombia) while (a), (b), (c) and (d) are the log of
International Price of Cocaine, log of Cultivated Hectares of Coca in Colombia, log of the domestic price of cocaine,
and the log of Eradicated Hectares of Coca in Colombia, respectively.‡ It is the log of Military Assistance Against
Drugs to Non-Latin-American Countries.
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Table 14—IV Estimation: Presidential Attention to Drugs On Economic Aid 1998-2012 - Falsification Test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Second Stage, Dependent Variable: Presidential Attention to Drugs
Economic Aid - Drugs† 0.0026 0.0027 0.0063** 0.0052 0.0049 0.0042
(0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0032) (0.0068) (0.0078) (0.0055)
US Attention - Drugs 0.0220** 0.0212** 0.0202* 0.0199* 0.0197* 0.0177*
(0.0090) (0.0095) (0.0121) (0.0115) (0.0114) (0.0102)
Intl. Pricea -0.0015 -0.0211 -0.0190 -0.0189 -0.0221*
(0.0052) (0.0087) (0.0113) (0.0068)
Cultivated Hectaresb 0.0105** 0.0090 0.0083 0.0064
(0.0059) (0.0067) (0.0077) (0.0104)
Domestic Pricec 0.0068 0.0071 0.0087
(0.0281) (0.0285) (0.0209)
Eradicated Hectaresd -0.0012 -0.0029
(0.0064) (0.0053)
Panel B: First Stage, Dependent Variable: Economic Assistance Against Drugs
Economic Aid NonLat‡ 2.0324*** 1.9363*** 1.7711*** 0.9465* 0.8031* 1.1080**
(0.3265) (0.3435) (0.3770) (0.5367) (0.4646) (0.4441)
US Attention - Drugs 0.2083 0.3590 0.3539 0.0670 -0.0193 0.2042
(0.6315) (0.6641) (0.6617) (0.6856) (0.6766) (0.6907)
Intl. Price a 0.8074 1.1998 1.4830* 1.3273 1.2477**
(0.5804) (0.8739) (0.8991) (0.9085) (0.5216)
Cultivated Hectaresb -0.2475 -0.7428* -1.0350*** -0.6418**
(0.3613) (0.4066) (0.3130) (0.2830)
Domestic Pricec 2.7952*** 2.5098** 2.1201**
(1.0379) (1.1138) (1.0328)
Eradicated Hectaresd -0.6558 -0.7167**
(0.4007) (0.2873)
President Fixed Effects - - - - - X
Month Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Time Specific Trends X X X X X X
Pres. Relationship FE X X X X X -
Observations 702 689 689 689 689 689
R2 0.3430 0.3416 0.3424 0.3554 0.3608 0.3421
F 49.95 40.64 39.09 34.93 33.86 34.58
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The Drugs agenda consists of the
fraction of speech dedicated to the following expressions: Droga + Drogas + Narcotra´fico + Coca over the total words
that were said by the Colombian president in each instance omitting the set of words in tables B1 and B2. The US
Attention consist of the expressions Drug + Drugs + Cocaine + Narcotics said in the last four weeks by US presidents.
† It Corresponds to Log(Economic Assistance Against Drugs - Colombia) while (a), (b), (c) and (d) are the log of
International Price of Cocaine, log of Cultivated Hectares of Coca in Colombia, log of the domestic price of cocaine,
and the log of Eradicated Hectares of Coca in Colombia, respectively.‡ It is the log of Economic Assistance Against
Drugs to Non-Latin-American Countries.
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Table 15—Presidential Attention in Years with High Military Assistance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Andre´s Pastrana 2000 1998-2002 Difference p-value
Mean Attention to Drugs 0,0084 0,0038 0,0046 0.00056
Standard Deviation of Attention to Drugs 0,0033 0,0039
Observations 53 209
A´lvaro Uribe I 2004 2002-2006 Difference p-value
Mean Attention to Terrorism 0,0157 0,0098 0,0060 0.0010
Standard Deviation of Attention to Terrorism 0,0081 0,0068
Observations 53 417
Notes: Column 2 shows the average presidential attention, during the period 1998-2002, omitting 2000 attention for
Andre´s Pastrana. Similarly, column 2 shows the average presidential attention, during the period 2002-2006, omitting
2004 attention for A´lvaro Uribe in his first term in office.
Table 16—Mechanisms: Correlations Between Coefficients of Interest and Change in CPI
Set of Coefficients CPI Anual Change
Coefficients: Attention to Terrorism on Military Aid without Assistance Against Drugs -0,4717
Coefficients: Attention to Terrorism on US Attention to Terrorism -0,5473
Coefficients: Attention to Drugs On Military Aid Against Drugs -0,186
Coefficients: Attention to Drugs On US Attention to Drugs -0,1615
Notes: CPI: Corruption Perceptions Index from International Transparency. Positive changes in CPI are associated
with improvements in the perception of transparency. The set of coefficients are obtained from the estimation of
equation (11) in each year (during 1998-2012) omitting president fixed effects.
Figure 8. Domestic Spending on Justice, Security and War on Drugs in Colombia
Source: (Rocha 2011) Data expressed as percent of 2005 GDP
Black - Security and Justice, Green - Security, Blue - Justice, Red - War on Drugs (Right Axis)
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Table 18—IV Estimation: Presidential Attention to Terrorism on Military Aid 1998-2012 - Robustness
Check - Domestic Spending: Security
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Second Stage, Dependent Variable: Presidential Attention to Terrorism
MilitaryAidTerror (Adj)† 0.1534* 0.1514* 0.1649* 0.1648* 0.1643* 0.2384
(0.0827) (0.0836) (0.0997) (0.0995) (0.0986) (0.2328)
US Attention - Terror 0.0705 0.0754 0.0851 0.0851 0.0848 0.1519
(0.0459) (0.0487) (0.0586) (0.0585) (0.0580) (0.1559)
Attacks Colombiaa 0.0044 0.0035 0.0034 0.0029 0.0033
(0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0049)
Attacks Worldwideb 0.0058 0.0058 0.0057 0.0070
(0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0072)
Deaths due to Attacksc 0.0000 -0.0011 -0.0046
(0.0008) (0.0026) (0.0068)
Attacks×Deaths 0.0010 0.0047
(0.0022) (0.0064)
Panel B: First Stage, Dep. Var: Military Aid without Assistance Against Drugs / Domestic Spending
Military Aid NonLat‡ 0.1953*** 0.1948*** 0.1820** 0.1822** 0.1833** 0.1228
(0.0684) (0.0702) (0.0715) (0.0716) (0.0717) (0.0759)
US Attention - Terror -0.5138*** -0.5518*** -0.5626*** -0.5626*** -0.5630*** -0.6662***
(0.0591) (0.0587) (0.0585) (0.0585) (0.0586) (0.0657)
Attacks-Colombiaa -0.0294*** -0.0229*** -0.0222*** -0.0171 -0.0136
(0.0067) (0.0072) (0.0083) (0.0109) (0.0133)
Attacks-Worldwideb -0.0282*** -0.0280*** -0.0277*** -0.0248**
(0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0118)
Deaths due to Attacksc -0.0008 0.0117 0.0229
(0.0050) (0.0151) (0.0195)
Attacks×Deaths -0.0107 -0.0229
(0.0127) (0.0162)
President Fixed Effects - - - - - X
Month Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Time Specific Trends X X X X X X
Pres. Relationship FE X X X X X -
Observations 702 637 637 637 637 637
R2 0.9640 0.9531 0.9538 0.9538 0.9539 0.9349
F 2173 1227 1260 1216 1145 905.1
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The terror agenda consists of the
fraction of speech dedicated to the following expressions: terrorismo + terrorista + terroristas + terror over the total
words that were said by the Colombian president in each instance omitting the set of words in tables B1 and B2. The
US Attention consist of the expressions Terrorism + Terrorist + Terrorists + Terror said in the last four weeks by US
presidents. † It Corresponds to log
(
Military Assistance Without Drugs - Colombia
Domestic Military Spending in Security
)
while (a), (b) y (c) are the log of
terrorist attacks in Colombia, the log of worldwide terrorist attacks excluding Colombia and the log of the number of
deaths due to terrorist attacks in Colombia, respectively. ‡ It is the log of Military Assistance to Non-Latin-American
Countries without the assistance against drugs).
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Table 20—IV Estimation: Presidential Attention to Drugs On Military Aid Against Drugs - Robustness
Check - Domestic Spending: War on Drugs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Second Stage, Dependent Variable: Presidential Attention to Drugs
MilitaryAid(Adj)-Drugs† -0.0126 -0.0216 0.0943 0.1166 -0.0555 0.3800
(0.0104) (0.0221) (0.1116) (0.4631) (0.1317) (4.5928)
US Attention - Drugs 0.0279** 0.0265** 0.0026 -0.0012 0.0261 -0.1196
(0.0109) (0.0124) (0.0261) (0.0806) (0.0254) (1.6430)
Intl. Pricea -0.0318 0.2089 0.2607 -0.1486 0.7393
(0.0373) (0.2479) (1.0635) (0.3306) (9.1103)
Cultivated Hectaresb -0.0419 -0.0523 0.0178 -0.1588
(0.0554) (0.2201) (0.0380) (1.9455)
Domestic Pricec -0.0090 0.0213 0.0144
(0.1401) (0.0174) (0.1471)
Eradicated Hectaresd -0.0330 0.1365
(0.0701) (1.7158)
Panel B: First Stage, Dependent Variable Military Assistance Against Drugs
Military Aid NonLat‡ -0.4142*** -0.2411*** 0.1184 0.0419 -0.0710 0.0122
(0.0848) (0.0849) (0.0815) (0.0994) (0.0890) (0.0881)
US Attention - Drugs 0.4214*** 0.1991 0.2102 0.1836 0.1157 0.3636**
(0.1493) (0.1371) (0.1301) (0.1339) (0.1360) (0.1413)
Int. Pricea -1.5041*** -2.3583*** -2.3320*** -2.4545*** -1.9898***
(0.1189) (0.1577) (0.1551) (0.1974) (0.1026)
Cultivated Hecatresb 0.5388*** 0.4929*** 0.2628*** 0.4275***
(0.0633) (0.0668) (0.0531) (0.0483)
Domestic Pricec 0.2592 0.0345 0.0088
(0.1618) (0.1848) (0.1963)
Eradicated Hectaresd -0.5164*** -0.3749***
(0.0691) (0.0422)
President Fixed Effects - - - - - X
Month Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Time Specific Trends X X X X X X
Pres. Relationship FE X X X X X -
Observations 702 689 689 689 689 689
R2 0.9743 0.9778 0.9812 0.9813 0.9842 0.9797
F 3595 5111 4589 5084 4371 4151
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The Drugs agenda consists of the
fraction of speech dedicated to the following expressions: Droga + Drogas + Narcotra´fico + Coca over the total
words that were said by the Colombian president in each instance omitting the set of words in tables B1 and B2.
The US Attention consist of the expressions Drug + Drugs + Cocaine + Narcotics said in the last four weeks by US
presidents. † It Corresponds to log
(
Military Assistance Against Drugs - Colombia
Domestic Military Spending in War on Drugs
)
while (a), (b), (c) and (d) are the
log of International Price of Cocaine, log of Cultivated Hectares of Coca in Colombia, log of the domestic price of
cocaine, and the log of Eradicated Hectares of Coca in Colombia, respectively.‡ It is the log of Military Assistance
Against Drugs to Non-Latin-American Countries.
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Table 21—Instruments’ Orthogonality
(1) (2)
AidColTerror† AidColDrugs‡
Military Aid Against Drugs Non Latin-American Countries -0.0403 -0.291***
(0.0436) (0.0170)
Military Aid Against Terror Non Latin-American Countries -0.480*** -0.0163
(0.0346) (0.0280)
Terrorism Covariates X -
Drugs Covariates - X
Month Fixed Effects X X
Specific Trends X X
Presidential Relationship Fixed Effects X X
Observations 637 689
R2 0.900 0.903
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. † log Military Aid Against Terror to
Colombia, ‡ log Military Aid Against Terror to Colombia.
Table 22—Domestic Spending and US Military Assistance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Domestic Spending Against Terror) ln(Domestic Spending Against Drugs)
AidColTerror† -0.1721** 0.0394*** 0.0421*** - - -
(0.0690) (0.0150) (0.0131)
AidColDrugs‡ - - - -1.2514*** -0.1587*** 0.0806***
(0.0987) (0.0229) (0.0161)
Constant 3.1462*** 1.0773*** 1.0954*** 10.8799*** 4.3553*** 3.2676***
(0.3787) (0.0788) (0.0666) (0.5058) (0.1099) (0.0707)
Specific Trend - X X - X X
Pres. Relationship FE - - X - - X
Observations 702 702 702 702 702 702
R2 0.0081 0.9869 0.9896 0.3108 0.9669 0.9834
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. † log Military Aid Against Terror to
Colombia, ‡ log Military Aid Against Terror to Colombia.
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A. Appendix: Proofs
Proof Proposition 1:
Suppose that A does not have possibilities of benefiting from the Aid given by
B, this is δk = 0. In this case, from the first order condition of (4) we have:
∂ΠkA
∂akA
: λkA + δ
kwk − C ′1(akA, λkA + (Ψ + akBlB)) = 0(A1)
: λkA − C
′
1(a
k,A,?, λkA + (Ψ + a
k
Bl
B)) = 0
Thus, the attention level ak,A,? in equilibrium will only depend on local acceptance
λkA and the attention level of B, then, ∂a
k
A/∂w
k = 0. Therefore, for B is sufficient
that δk > 0 in order to set the agenda. This mechanism is sufficient but not necessary
because ∂akA/∂a
k
B could be not equal to zero .
Proof Proposition 2:
From (A1) we know that ak,?A ≡ f(λkA,Ψ + akBlB) thus, we also know that while
lB > 0 we have that ∂a
k
A/∂a
k
B > 0. Note that this expression is true because f
′
2 > 0
due to
∂(C
′
1)
−1
∂akB
< 0 
C. Sources of Rhetoric Information
The information for Colombian presidents was obtained using the web tool: http:
//archive.org and archives from the official web page http://www.presidencia.
gov.co. The information for US presidents was obtained from
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov, http://clinton.archives.gov
and http://www.whitehouse.gov.
Total number of speeches processed: 14.865
• Colombia: 3.529 speeches that consist of :
– 703 speeches for Andre´s Pastrana Arango
– 2.115 speeches for A´lvaro Uribe Ve´lez
– 711 speeches forJuan Manuel Santos Caldero´n
• United States: 11.336 speeches that consist of:
– 1.217 speeches for William J. Clinton
– 8.298 speeches for George W. Bush
– 1.821 speeches for Barack H. Obama
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